

**TRANSMITTAL LETTER  
(General - Patent Pending)**

Docket No.  
17474(PC25308A)

In Re Application Of: **Mark A. Dombroski, et al.**

Serial No.

10/649,227

Filing Date

August 27, 2003

Examiner

Evelyn Mei Huang

Group Art Unit

1625

Title: **ALKYL-[4-(DIFLUOROPHENYL)-OXAZOL-5-YL]-TRIAZOLO-PYRIDINES**

**TO THE COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS:**

Transmitted herewith is:

**RESPONSE TO RESTRICTION REQUIREMENT**

in the above identified application.

No additional fee is required.


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
Dated: **May 11, 2004**

**Peter I. Bernstein**  
Registration No.: 43,497  
**SCULLY, SCOTT, MURPHY & PRESSER**  
400 Garden City Plaza  
Garden City, NY 11530  
(516)742-4343

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**Peter I. Bernstein**  
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
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
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**Peter I. Bernstein**

*Typed or Printed Name of Person Mailing Correspondence*

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE**

**Applicant(s):** Mark A. Dombroski, et al.

**Examiner:** Evelyn Mei Huang

**Serial No:** 10/649,227

**Art Unit:** 1625

**Filed:** August 27, 2003

**Docket:** 17474(PC25308A)

**For:** ALKYL-[4-(DIFLUOROPHENYL)-OXAZOL-5-YL]-TRIAZOLO-PYRIDINES

**Dated:** May 11, 2004

**Confirmation No.: 5400**

Commissioner for Patents  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

**RESPONSE UNDER 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 and 1.143**


Sir:

In response to the Office Action dated April 14, 2004, setting forth a requirement for restriction and in accordance with the provisions of 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 and 1.143, Applicants provisionally elect, with traverse, Group 1, Claims 1-9, drawn to a compound, classified in class 546, subclass 119.

**CERTIFICATE OF MAILING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.8(a)**

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Dated: May 11, 2004



Peter I. Bernstein

## **REMARKS**

In the Office Action dated April 14, 2004, the Examiner has set forth a requirement for restriction under 35 U.S.C. §121, alleging that the subject matter defined by the claims of the present invention represents the following two separate and distinct inventions:

Group I. Claims 1-9, drawn to a compound classified in class 546, subclass 119.

Group II. Claims 10-15, drawn to a composition and its method of use, classified in class 514, subclass 303.

In order to be fully responsive to the Examiner's requirement for restriction, Applicants provisionally elect to prosecute the subject matter of Group I, Claims 1-9, drawn to a compound. Applicants reserve the right to file one or more divisional applications directed to the non-elected subject matter in this application.

However, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 and 1.143, Applicants hereby traverse the Examiner's requirement for restriction and request reconsideration thereof in view of the following remarks.

An Examiner's authority to require restriction is defined and limited by statute:

If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Commissioner may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions.

35 U.S.C. §121, first sentence (emphasis added). The implementing regulations of the Patent and Trademark Office include the mandate that restriction is appropriate only in cases presenting inventions which are both independent and distinct, 37 C.F.R. §§1.141-142. Without a showing of independence and distinctness, a restriction requirement is unauthorized. In the present application, the claims which the Examiner has grouped separately are not "independent and distinct" so as to justify the restriction requirement.

The Examiner has asserted that Groups I and II are related as product and method of use and are patentably distinct inventions. Applicants respectfully traverse.

The Examiner has not shown that the claimed compounds can be used on a materially different process of using that product. The Examiner simply alleges that the claimed compounds have multiple uses, such as for the treatment of arthritis, Alzheimer's disease or diabetes.

However, the compounds of the invention are all MAP kinase inhibitors, preferably p38 kinase inhibitors. Since MAP kinase inhibitors can be used to treat arthritis, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes, as disclosed in the present application, these uses all relate to MAP kinase inhibitors and therefore relate to the same invention. Accordingly, the MAP kinase inhibitors of the presently claimed invention are not being used in materially different processes.

Second, the Examiner has not shown that the process of using the compounds of the invention can be used on another compound with a materially different structure. The Examiner merely alleges that another compound, Aricept, can be used to treat Alzheimer's disease. Aricept is known to inhibit cholinesterase. Aricept is not a MAP kinase inhibitor. Accordingly, the Examiner has not shown that the process of using a compound that differs materially in structure from the claimed compounds can be used as MAP kinase inhibitors.

MPEP §806.05(h) explicitly places the burden on the Examiner to provide an example to show that claims to a product and to their methods of use are patentably distinct inventions. The Examiner has not met the burden of showing that the claims of Groups I and II are distinct inventions.

Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that this Restriction Requirement be removed.

Furthermore, Applicants respectfully submit that Groups I and II are different aspects of a single invention. The methods of Group II merely teach how to use the compounds of Group I.

The courts have recognized that it is in the public interest to permit applicants to claim several aspects of their invention together in one application, as the applicants have done herein. The CCPA has observed:

We believe the constitutional purpose of the patent system is promoted by encouraging applicants to claim, and therefore to describe in the manner required by 35 U.S.C. §112 all aspects as to what they regard as their invention, regardless of the number of statutory classes involved.

In re Kuehl, 456 F.2d 658, 666, 117 U.S.P.Q. 250, 256 (CCPA 1973). This interest is consistent with the practical reality that a sufficiently detailed disclosure supporting claims to one aspect of

an invention customarily is sufficient to support claims in the same application to other aspects of the invention.

The Examiner also states that the inventions have acquired a separate status in the art as evidenced by the separate classification (subclasses) and recognized divergent subject matter and would require independent searches. Thus, the Examiner concludes that restriction for examination purposes is proper.

Reliance on the supposed classification (subclasses) of the groups of claims does not establish independence and distinctness. The classification system has no statutory recognition as evidence of whether inventions are independent and distinct. The classification system is instead an aid in finding and searching for patents.

The classification system is also an unreliable basis for requiring restriction between claims to the various aspects of applicants' unitary invention, because the system exhibits considerable overlap in technical definitions. In particular, the definitions of classes and subclasses in the classification system do not prevent the Examiner from basing patentability decisions, as to claims assigned to one group, on patent references found in the classes or subclass(es) with which he associated another group of claims.

Furthermore, the classification system is a poor basis for requiring restriction between related aspects of an invention because classifications and definitions change over time. Thus, a classification that might have seemed to support restriction at a given time could change, thereby casting a shadow over the propriety of the restriction requirement later on during the term of the patents issuing from parent and divisional applications. Indeed, classifications seem largely to change in response to considerations of administrative convenience, and often in response to nothing more than growth in the number of patents in a given class or subclass. These considerations have nothing to do with whether the subject matter of patents assigned to different classifications is "independent and distinct" as those terms are used in 35 U.S.C. §121, which fact proves that basing restriction requirements on the classification system is improper.

Applicants respectfully suggest that in view of the continued increase of official fees and the potential limitation of an applicant's financial resources, a practice which arbitrarily imposes restriction requirements may become prohibitive and thereby contravene the constitutional purpose to promote and encourage the progress of science and the useful arts. Moreover, under the regulatory changes as a consequence of the General Agreement on Trade

and Tariffs (GATT), applicants are required to conduct simultaneous prosecution, as here, requiring excessive filing costs or to otherwise compromise the term of related patent assets.

It is vital to all applicants that restriction requirements issue only with the proper statutory authorization, because patents issuing on divisional applications which are filed to prosecute claims that the Examiner held to be independent and distinct can be vulnerable to legal challenges alleging double patenting. The third sentence of 35 U.S.C. §121, which states that a patent issuing on a parent application "shall not be used as a reference" against a divisional application or a patent issued thereon, does not provide comfort to applicants against such allegations. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has declined to hold that §121 protects a patentee from an allegation of same-invention double patenting, Studiengesellschaft Kohle GmbH v. Northern Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 355, 288 U.S.P.Q. 837, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In Gerber Garment Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the court held that §121 does not insulate a patentee from an allegation of "obviousness-type" double patenting, and in fact affirmed the invalidation on double patenting grounds of a patent that had issued from a divisional application filed following a restriction requirement. Furthermore, it is far from clear that the step of filing a terminal disclaimer is available to resolve a double patenting issue that arises after the issuance of a patent on the divisional application.

All these considerations indicate that the imposition of a restriction requirement with inadequate authority can lead to situations in which an applicant's legitimate patent rights are exposed to uncertainty and even extinguished. Accordingly, to protect a patentee's rights and to serve the public interest in the legitimacy of issued patents, Applicants respectfully urge the Examiner not to require restriction in cases such as the present application wherein various aspects in a unitary invention are claimed.

Finally, Applicants respectfully submit that a determination to make the pending restriction requirement final must evidence the patentable distinctness of all defined groups, one from the other, as presented by the Examiner.

In view of the foregoing comments, it is respectfully urged that the Examiner reconsider and withdraw the requirement for restriction and provide an action on the merits with respect to all the claims.

Respectfully submitted,



Peter I. Bernstein  
Registration No. 43,497

SCULLY, SCOTT, MURPHY & PRESSER  
400 Garden City Plaza  
Garden City, New York 11530  
(516) 742-4343

PIB/RLB:nis